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The sunk cost effect, an interesting and well-known maladaptive behavior, is pervasive in real life, and 
thus has been studied in various disciplines, including economics, psychology, organizational behavior, 
politics, and biology. However, the neural mechanisms underlying the sunk cost effect have not been 
clearly established, nor have their association with differences in individual susceptibility to the effect. 
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we investigated neural responses induced by sunk 
costs along with measures of core human personality. We found that individuals who tend to adhere to 
social rules and regulations (who are high in measured agreeableness and conscientiousness) are more 
susceptible to the sunk cost effect. Furthermore, this behavioral observation was strongly mediated 
by insula activity during sunk cost decision-making. Tight coupling between the insula and lateral 
prefrontal cortex was also observed during decision-making under sunk costs. Our findings reveal how 
individual differences can affect decision-making under sunk costs, thereby contributing to a better 
understanding of the psychological and neural mechanisms of the sunk cost effect.
“Waste not, want not” is a rule that humans are repeatedly taught from childhood. Undoubtedly, avoiding waste is 
essential for allocating scarce resources efficiently. However, an overgeneralization of this highly adaptive rule can 
ironically result in “throwing good money after bad,” a maladaptive economic behavior known as the sunk cost 
effect1–3. The sunk cost effect has long been documented in various disciplines, including economics, psychology, 
politics, organizational behavior, and biology.
The sunk cost effect is the tendency to continue an investment, or take an action, even though it has higher 
future costs than benefits, if costs of time, money, or effort were previously incurred1. A clear example of the sunk 
cost effect was proposed by Arkes and Blumer (1985): Suppose that “you have spent $100 on a ticket for a trip to 
Michigan. Several weeks later you buy a $50 ticket for a trip to Wisconsin. You think you will enjoy the Wisconsin 
trip more than the Michigan trip. When you are putting your just-purchased Wisconsin trip ticket in your wallet, you 
notice that the Michigan trip and the Wisconsin trip are for the same weekend! It is too late to refund either ticket. 
You must use one ticket and not the other. Which trip will you go on?”1.
According to an assumption of traditional economics theory, decisions should be made based on the costs 
and benefits expected to arise in the future from the choice of each option4. Based on this assumption, everyone 
would be expected to choose the trip considered to be more enjoyable (i.e., the trip to Wisconsin). However, 
about half of the participants in the experiment chose the Michigan trip instead, which had incurred the larger 
sunk cost1. Because an invested sunk cost cannot be recovered, a rational forward-looking decision maker should 
ignore sunk costs1–3. However, nonhuman species, individuals, companies, and even governments often decide 
without ignoring sunk costs. For example, people who pay less at an all-you-can-eat pizza restaurant, because of 
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a surprise reduction in the price, then eat less pizza5. Singaporeans who happen to pay more for an expensive car 
permit then drive their cars more6. These types of maladaptive behavior can also lead to severe financial or polit-
ical consequences such as continuation of an unprofitable building project or war1–3,7. Please see Supplementary 
Introduction for details regarding prior research concerning the sunk cost effect.
This leads to a question intended to prevent serious consequences: who is more vulnerable to the sunk cost 
effect? Although some factors were reported to be associated with the sunk cost effect8,9, this issue remains largely 
unknown. Such differences are important because they are clues to the psychological mechanism generating the 
effect, and for placing the right type of people in organizational jobs when ignoring sunk cost is beneficial.
Meanwhile, our understanding of how decision-making is implemented in the brain has grown rapidly in 
recent years10–15. Although the neural bases of many types of decision-making have been extensively examined, 
to the best of our knowledge, only two neuroimaging studies have focused on decisions involving sunk costs16,17; 
those studies are described in the Discussion section below. Neither of these studies measured participants’ per-
sonality traits, and therefore the neural mechanism that underlies individual differences in the sunk cost effect 
remains unclear.
Here, we combined functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and an assessment of the core aspects 
of human personality. Previous neuroeconomics studies repeatedly reported that emotions play essential roles 
in decision-making processes, and that individual differences in neural activity of the emotion-related brain 
regions [e.g., insula, amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)] explain susceptibility to a biased and irrational 
decision-making18–20. In line with this notion, a previous behavioral study showed that the negative emotions 
associated with sunk costs could bias decision-making under sunk costs21. Accordingly, one might intuitively pre-
dict that individuals sensitive to negative emotions or stress (e.g., people with high neuroticism) would be more 
susceptible to a sunk cost effect. However, sunk costs may elicit strong negative emotions in people who feel fear 
or a sense of guilt regarding violations of the “don’t waste” rule. In other words, it could be predicted that people 
who adhere to social norms and values are more susceptible to the sunk cost effect. Furthermore, we hypothesized 
that this potential observation might be explained by the elevated activation in brain regions crucial to negative 
emotional processing during decision-making under sunk costs.
Results
We modified a clear example of the sunk cost effect described above (Fig. 1). Subjects first express a preference for 
which of two cities to travel to. Then they are told they have, by mistake, previously paid for nonrefundable tickets 
to both cities (which are sunk costs). In the control condition the tickets are priced reasonably and the costs of 
the two tickets are identical. In the sunk cost condition the ticket for the non-preferred destination is 50% higher 
than the ticket price from the preferred destination. A decision maker sufficiently influenced by the sunk cost will 
switch his/her choice in this condition.
Figure 1. Experimental design. In each trial, subjects first express a preference for which of two cities to travel 
to (preference phase). Then they are told they have, by mistake, previously paid for nonrefundable tickets to 
both cities (which are sunk costs). In the control condition the tickets are priced reasonably and the costs of 
the two tickets are identical. In the sunk cost condition the ticket for the non-preferred destination is 50% 
higher than the ticket price from the preferred destination. A decision maker sufficiently influenced by the sunk 
cost will switch his/her choice in this condition. Figure 1 depicts the case in which New York is chosen in the 
preference phase. Estimation of the sunk cost effect is also described.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
3Scientific RepoRts | 6:33171 | DOI: 10.1038/srep33171
Behavior data. Participants (N = 32) performed the task well, only missing an average of 0.53 (S.D. = 0.67) 
trials (46 trials in total). The mean rates of choosing the option that would be enjoyed less were 47.9 (S.D. = 35.5) 
% under the sunk cost condition but only 0.8 (S.D. = 2.0) % under the control condition, which indicates that the 
participants’ decisions were influenced by sunk costs.
In the five domains of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R)22,23, the measures of both agree-
ableness and conscientiousness were positively correlated with individual differences in the strength of the sunk 
cost effect (r = 0.51, p = 0.003 and r = 0.36, p = 0.046, respectively, Fig. 2a,b); the other three domains did not 
significantly correlate with the sunk cost effect (all, p > 0.31, Supplementary Table S1). The results of each domain 
in NEO-PI-R were provided in Supplementary Table S2. Among the five domains of NEO, high levels of agreea-
bleness and conscientiousness have both been reported to associate with adherence to social rules and decreased 
risk taking24,25, whereas higher scores in neuroticism, extraversion, and openness are associated with increased 
risk taking24,26. Therefore, we also averaged these two scores (agreeableness, conscientiousness) and correlated 
that average with the sunk cost effect. The averaged score was more strongly correlated with the sunk cost effect 
(r = 0.53, p = 0.002, Fig. 2c).
fMRI data. Figure  3 and Supplementary Table S3 present the neural activations associated with 
decision-making under sunk costs (i.e., sunk cost condition > control condition). We identified several regions of 
activation, including the left insula, inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), pregenual ACC (pgACC), dorsal ACC (dACC) 
extending into the supplementary motor area (SMA), and right occipital lobe. In contrast, we did not find any sig-
nificant regions of deactivation on decision-making under sunk costs (i.e., control condition > sunk cost condi-
tion) at the same thresholds. Of these identified areas of differential activation, only the levels of activation in the 
left insula (positively) correlated with the sunk cost effect (Fig. 4a and Supplementary Table S4). This correlation 
Figure 2. Correlation between personality traits and the sunk cost effect. Plots and regression lines of 
correlation between personality traits and the sunk cost effect are shown (N = 32). (a) Correlation between 
agreeableness and the sunk cost effect (r = 0.51, p = 0.003), (b) correlation between conscientiousness and the 
sunk cost effect (r = 0.36, p = 0.046), and (c) correlation between averaged score of these two personality traits 
and the sunk cost effect (r = 0.53, p = 0.002). Dashed lines are 95% confidence interval boundaries. *overlapping 
data point.
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was not evident in other areas such as the ACC. There were no brain areas with activation showing significant 
negative correlation with the sunk cost effect.
Next, we conducted mediation analyses to examine whether this activation mediated the relationship between 
the identified personality traits and the sunk cost effect. These analyses revealed that activation in the left insula 
mediated the relationship of these personality traits (agreeableness, conscientiousness, and averaged scores of 
these personality domains) with the sunk cost effect (Fig. 4b and Supplementary Fig. S1).
Finally, we performed psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis using the left insula as seed region. The 
results showed that the functional connectivity between the left insula and left lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), 
including the IFG, was increased during decision-making under sunk costs (Fig. 5 and Supplementary Table S5). 
We did not find any significant regions showing decreased functional connectivity with the left insula at the same 
threshold.
Additional analyses. Because some participants showed preference reversals in some trials of the control 
condition, we also analyzed the data using the sunk cost measure taking this into account (rates of preference 
reversals under sunk cost condition – those under control condition). The results did not influence our conclu-
sion (please see Supplementary Results, Supplementary Fig. S2 and Table S6 for details).
Discussion
We found that individuals with high levels of agreeableness and conscientiousness were more susceptible to the 
sunk cost effect. Furthermore, we show that elevated neural activation in the insula explains the relationship 
between these personality traits and the sunk cost effect. Our findings comprise important practical implications 
and add to our understanding of the psychological and neural mechanisms of this effect.
Agreeableness is a personality trait characterized by altruism, compliance, and tender-mindedness. Highly 
agreeable people are well socialized and avoid conflict in social situations22,27. Individuals with high levels of 
conscientiousness are organized, careful, reliable, hard-working, and avoid counterproductive work behav-
iors22,28. Among the five domains of NEO, higher scores in agreeableness and conscientiousness have been 
reported to associate with a reduction in risk taking behaviors24,25, whereas higher scores in neuroticism, extra-
version, and openness are associated with increased risk taking24,26. In other words, individuals with high levels of 
Figure 3. Activations associated with decision-making under sunk costs. A statistical threshold was set at 
cluster-level FDR corrected q < 0.01 (N = 32). dACC = dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, IFG = inferior frontal 
gyrus, MPFC = medial prefrontal cortex, pgACC = pregenual anterior cingulate cortex, SMA = supplementary 
motor area.
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Figure 4. Contribution of the insula in the sunk cost effect. (a) The cluster including the left insula (peak 
MNI coodinates: –32, 16, –10) was positively correlated with individual differences in the sunk cost effect 
(cluster-level FDR corrected q < 0.05, N = 32). (b) Bias-corrected/accelerated 95% confidence intervals (CI) 
for the indirect effect from a bootstrap-mediation analysis found that activation in the left insula mediated 
the relationship between the averaged score of agreeableness and conscientiousness and the sunk cost effect 
(N = 32). Standardized coefficients and significance indicated by asterisks are reported for each path. *p < 0.05, 
**p < 0.01.
Figure 5. Result of psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis. The functional connectivity between the 
left insula and left lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) was increased during decision-making under sunk costs 
(cluster-level FDR corrected q < 0.05, N = 32).
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agreeableness and conscientiousness are people who tend to strongly adhere to social norms and values. Notably, 
however, the present results suggest that these people, who are adaptive in normal daily life, may paradoxically 
make maladaptive decisions under sunk cost situations. Our finding may offer clues for the possible psychological 
mechanism generating the sunk cost effect.
The fMRI showed a stronger activation in the left insula during decision-making under sunk costs. 
Furthermore, differential activity in the same region across subjects was highly correlated with individual differ-
ences in the strength of the sunk cost effect. These results suggest that the insula is a key neural substrate under-
lying individual differences in the sunk cost effect.
Further analyses showed that this insula activity mediated the relationship between the agreeableness/con-
scientiousness and the sunk cost effect. The insula is known to be involved in olfaction, gustation, pain, and 
somatosensory processing29. Especially, the dorsal anterior region identified in our study plays an essential role in 
negative emotional processing, and activity there has therefore been proposed as a neural marker of anticipatory 
negative affect30–32. We speculate that sunk costs may elicit stronger negative emotions in individuals socialized 
to follow rules and regulations (those with high levels of agreeableness/conscientiousness), and as a result such 
people experience greater sunk cost effects. In addition, previous studies have reported that people exhibiting 
higher insula activation during risky decision-making exhibited higher loss avoidance; the authors proposed that 
this region plays a key role in learning to avoid losses33,34. Taken together, our findings support the theory that the 
sunk cost effect may, at least partially, be due to adherence to a no-waste principle1,2.
Contrary to the intuitive prediction that a personality sensitive to negative emotions (neuroticism) would 
be related to the sunk cost effect, we found no correlation between the levels of neuroticism and the sunk cost 
effect. One possible interpretation is that, as mentioned above, sunk costs might elicit strong negative emotions in 
people who feel fear or a sense of guilt regarding violations of a no-waste principle. This notion should be further 
investigated in future studies.
The results of the functional connectivity analysis also supported that the insula is a key structure involved 
in the sunk cost effect. The PPI analysis showed that the functional connectivity between the left insula and left 
LPFC, including the IFG, was enhanced during decision-making under sunk costs. The LPFC is known to be 
involved in self-control35, emotion regulation36, and working memory37,38. Furthermore, social norms are thought 
to be represented in the LPFC, and this area plays a key role in rule-based control39,40. In line with this notion, a 
recent study showed that anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) of dorsal LPFC increases the sunk 
cost effect41. Therefore, tight coupling between these two regions might bias decision-making under the influence 
of sunk costs.
In addition to the left insula and the IFG, we found that the pgACC/MPFC and dACC/SMA were activated 
during decision-making under sunk costs. These ACC subregions are known to be involved in emotion regula-
tion42 and cognitive/emotional conflict processing43,44. The cluster we identified (peak coordinates; −6, 38, 20) 
also partly overlaps with the brain areas that have been associated with goal valuation in previous studies35,45. Our 
results may suggest that the decision regarding whether to prioritize preference or sunk costs involves an emo-
tional conflict. Of course, this is a post-hoc inference mentioned to guide future work and is clearly speculative.
Two previous studies explored neural activity involving sunk costs16,17. Both studies used a project-continuation 
paradigm. In this paradigm, an initial investment is made but project completion requires a further incremental 
investment. The sunk cost effect was shown because people were more willing to make the second incremental 
investment if a previous investment was made. However, sunk costs are not restricted to situations with negative 
feedback and uncertainty of decision consequences1. Thus, it is important to apply a variety of sunk cost scenar-
ios for a better understanding of the neural mechanisms of decision-making under sunk costs. In this study, we 
employed a different example of the sunk cost effect from that used in a previous study1. The neural results of the 
current study partly differ from those of previous studies, which might be due to difference of the experimental 
paradigms applied.
One study16 found distinct neural coding of the sunk cost and the incremental cost, with coding of sunk cost 
in parietal and frontal areas (overlapping with the SMA area in our Fig. 3). However, the authors did not associate 
neural activity and behavior. The second study17 found more activity in the dorsal LPFC and amygdala when sunk 
costs were larger; they also found activity in ACC as we did. Across subjects, the sunk cost effect is only weakly 
correlated positively with dorsal LPFC activity. However, a direct individual-specific measure of desire to avoid 
waste is more strongly correlated with dorsal LPFC (most recently, the same group again showed a critical role of 
the dorsal LPFC in the sunk cost effect using transcranial direct current stimulation41). Our study is consistent 
with the latter finding, that following a no-waste principle causes the sunk cost effect, and lateral PFC areas are 
associated with implementation of this principle.
There are several limitations to this study. First, in the current task, the ticket prices were systematically higher 
in the sunk cost condition compared with the control condition because the ticket price for the non-preferred 
destination was presented at 50% higher than the ticket price from the preferred one in the sunk cost condition. 
It is possible that brain activation during sunk cost decision-making identified in the current study could have 
partially reflected higher incurred ticket prices of the non-preferred option or the higher sum of the preferred 
and non-preferred ticket prices. However, even reducing the confounding effect of the ticket prices, we still found 
that our identified regions (e.g., insula, IFG, ACC) were activated, indicating the crucial roles of these areas in 
sunk cost decision-making (please see Supplementary Results and Supplementary Table 7). Second, this study 
used a hypothetical choice experiment to understand actual choices under the influence of sunk costs. Further 
research implementing real choice will be needed to support the present results. Finally, we recruited our sample 
from graduate and undergraduate students to ensure a uniform socioeconomic status among our participants. 
Therefore, our findings might not be representative of various samples with different backgrounds and socioeco-
nomic status levels. Our results should be generalized cautiously. Notwithstanding these limitations, our findings 
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revealed how individual differences can affect decision-making under sunk costs, thereby contributing to a better 
understanding of the psychological and neural mechanisms of the sunk cost effect.
Methods
Participants. Thirty-five healthy right-handed volunteers participated in this study. They were recruited from 
among undergraduate and graduate students (three were research fellows or trainees). The sample size was deter-
mined based on the previous neuroimaging studies of individual differences in decision-making e.g., refs 34,46. 
The volunteers did not meet the criteria for any psychiatric disorders according to the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID I). They also did not have a history of head trauma, any neurolog-
ical illness, serious medical or surgical illness, or substance abuse. Predicted IQ was estimated using the Japanese 
Version of the National Adult Reading Test short form47. Three participants were excluded from the analyses: one 
exhibited insufficient responses during the task [she did not make a response in 15 out of the 46 trials, which was 
extremely high as compared to the average missed trials of the participants (> 2 S.D. + mean)]. Two participants 
showed excessive head motion (> 3 mm) during the scanning. Therefore, we analyzed data from the remaining 
32 participants [12 females; mean age: 24.5 (S.D. = 6.5) years (range 19–38 years)]. Estimated mean IQ was 107.6 
(S.D. = 7.3).
This study was approved by the Committee on Medical Ethics of Kyoto University and was carried out in 
accordance with The Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association. After complete description of the study, 
written informed consent was obtained from each participant.
fMRI Task. We modified the sunk cost task used in a previous study1. Participants were initially instructed 
to select their preferred option from two travel destinations by pressing a button on a magnet-compatible 
button-box (preference phase). Next, participants received the following instructions: “You mistakenly purchased 
both of the tickets. You cannot get a refund, and the departure date is the same for both. Which one will you 
choose”? The task had 46 trials. In half of the trials (control condition), the costs of the two tickets were identical. 
Twenty-three different pairs of destinations (e.g., New York vs Los Angeles) were presented. Each destination was 
presented only once (all 23 destination pairs are shown in Supplementary Table S8). The costs of the tickets were 
defined realistically, from among five costs (¥30,000, ¥40,000, ¥50,000, ¥80,000, ¥100,000). In the other half of the 
trials (sunk cost condition), the participants selected from the same destination pairs and ticket costs. However, 
tickets for the destinations non-preferred (not chosen by the participants in the preference phase) were presented 
as 1.5 times more expensive than tickets for the preferred (chosen in the preference phase) destinations. A deci-
sion maker sufficiently influenced by the sunk cost would switch his/her choice in this condition. The trial order 
was pseudo-randomized and the total length of the task was 13 min and 57 s. The time course is shown in Fig. 1. 
The experiment was conducted using E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA).
Personality assessment. We administered the Japanese version of NEO-PI-R22,23, one of the most widely 
used questionnaires for assessing broad personality traits. This self-report questionnaire comprises 240 items 
and contains five dimensional scales (neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientious-
ness) that correspond to a five-factor personality trait model. Neuroticism consists of 48 items (e.g., “I am easily 
frightened”), extraversion has 48 items (e.g., “I like to have a lot of people around me”), openness has 48 items 
(e.g., “I have a very active imagination”), agreeableness has 48 items (e.g., “I would rather cooperate with others 
than compete with them”), and conscientiousness also has 48 items (e.g., “I’m known for my prudence and com-
mon sense”). Participants are asked to respond to each item by designating answers from 0 (strongly disagree) to 
4 (strongly agree). NEO-PI-R results are presented as T scores with a mean of 50 and standard deviation (S.D.) of 
10. Higher scores indicate higher levels of the particular trait.
fMRI data acquisition and pre-processing. fMRI images were scanned on a 3 T Trio (Siemens, Erlangen, 
Germany) equipped with an 8-channel phased-array head coil and pre-processed using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust 
Center for Neuroimaging, London, UK) (see Supplementary Methods for a more detailed description of the fMRI 
data acquisition and pre-processing).
Statistical analyses. Demographic and behavioral data (sunk cost effect). Demographic and behavioral 
data were analyzed using SPSS 21 (IBM, Armonk, NY, USA). We estimated the participants’ sunk cost effects by 
calculating the rate of choosing the option that would be enjoyed less (i.e., was initially dispreferred, but has a 
higher sunk ticket price) while under sunk cost condition (Fig. 1). We performed Pearson correlation analyses 
between the sunk cost effect and each T score of the five domains of NEO-PI-R to investigate the relationship 
between the sunk cost effect and the core aspects of human personality. Furthermore, because high levels of 
agreeableness and conscientiousness were both reported to associate with adherence to social rules and decreased 
risk taking24,25, we averaged these two scores and performed correlation analysis with the sunk cost effect (please 
see Results section). Results were considered statistically significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
fMRI data. After pre-processing, we fitted a general linear model (GLM)48 to the fMRI data. In the first-level 
analyses, the design matrix contained three task-related regressors (preference phase, and sunk cost and control 
conditions). We used the time-point of the button press as onset (duration, 0 s) based on the recent fMRI studies 
of decision-making e.g., ref. 17. To minimize motion-related artifacts, six movement parameters (three displace-
ments and three rotations) were also included as additional regressors of no interest. Data were high-pass filtered 
at 128 s. The activation associated with decision-making under sunk costs was identified as the difference between 
the sunk cost and control conditions. The comparison produced a contrast image for each participant, which was 
used for the second-level fMRI analyses.
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In the second-level analyses, we used a random-effects model to draw population-level inferences. First, the 
main effects of decision-making under sunk costs were computed using one-sample t-tests (whole-brain analysis). 
Clusters that survived the false-discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple comparisons with a cluster-level 
q < 0.01 (at voxel-level uncorrected p < 0.001) were reported.
Next, we performed a voxelwise regression analysis using the above-mentioned clusters as an inclusion mask 
to explore the brain regions in which activity during decision-making under sunk costs correlated with individual 
differences in the sunk cost effect. The statistical threshold was defined at a cluster-level q < 0.05 after correcting 
for multiple comparisons using FDR (at voxel-level uncorrected p < 0.005). The VOI function in SPM8 was used 
to extract the parameter estimates from the significant clusters. Next, we conducted mediation analyses using the 
INDIRECT macro for SPSS49 to investigate the mediation effect of neural activation in areas where correlations 
were observed for the relationships between personality traits and the sunk cost effect. We tested the significance 
of the mediation effect with a bootstrapping strategy within this macro. Using this strategy, if a confidence inter-
val does not contain zero, the mediated effect is considered significant49.
Finally, we conducted PPI analysis50 to identify areas in the brain that showed significant co-variation with 
the brain region that correlated with individual differences in the sunk cost effect (whole-brain analysis). The 
above-mentioned analyses identified that the left insula (peak MNI coodinates: −32, 16, −10) was correlated 
with individual differences in the sunk cost effect, and thus we selected this region as a seed region. Firstly, the 
first eigenvariate time series for each participant was extracted from the left insula (centered at −32, 16, −10; 
with a 5-mm radius). The PPI was then calculated as the product of the time series of the seed region and a 
vector coding for the psychological context (i.e., the sunk cost – control condition). For each participant, we 
created a new GLM including the PPI as a regressor together with the physiological and psychological vec-
tors. The GLM also included six movement parameters as regressors of no interest. The participants’ specific 
contrast images were then entered into random effects group analyses. The statistical threshold was defined 
at a cluster-level q < 0.05 after correcting for multiple comparisons using FDR (at voxel-level uncorrected 
p < 0.005).
We interpreted the anatomical locations of clusters by consulting the Talairach Daemon database (http://www.
talairach.org), the Anatomic Automatic Labeling toolbox51, and neuroanatomy atlas books52,53.
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